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Introduction
2020 provided the American oil and gas industry with a myriad of
unprecedented problems. The novel coronavirus, COVID-19, sits
predominately at the root of these unprecedented problems. Originating in
Wuhan, China, as early as December 2019, COVID-19 has quickly swept
across the globe, immensely impacting public health, travel, and global
industry. Foreign and domestic industry alike incurred substantial economic
blowback with lasting consequence. Among the industries most impacted
by the global pandemic is the oil and gas industry. Global travel
restrictions, international price disputes, and looming storage concerns have
effectively thwarted the industry, causing panic and confusion among
industry officials.
This comment will analyze the implications of exercising force majeure
provisions in oil and gas contracts. Specifically, this comment will analyze
whether COVID-19 fits within the ambit of an affirmative defense to
contractual non-performance.
Part one will outline the basic structure of an oil and gas lease. Part two
will define the concept of force majeure and its applicability within an oil
and gas lease. Additionally, part two will discuss situations in which force
majeure is invoked both generally and in relation to oil and gas leases. Part
three introduces COVID-19’s impact on the oil and gas industry from both
a foreign and domestic perspective. Part four will discuss whether COVID19 can serve as an affirmative defense to contractual performance. Part four
will also introduce alternative defense to non-performance and whether
COVID-19 justifies contractual relief within each defense. Finally, part five
will discuss whether contracting parties should account for COVID-19
when negotiating contracts in the future.
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The Structure of an Oil and Gas Lease
An oil and gas lease generally consists of a habendum clause, a granting
clause, and various savings clauses. Oil and gas leases are fundamentally
structured on a two-term basis. Habendum clauses are standard staples in
any ordinary oil and gas lease used to define a primary term to the lessee
for the development of the property.1 The primary term of an oil and gas
lease is fixed, while a secondary term is imposed variably—most notably
structured to continue so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced. 2
Production is requisite to maintain any lease. Failure to produce terminates
the lease.3 To determine whether production, or lack thereof, withstands
termination depends largely on jurisdiction. 4 The majority approach,
followed by states including Texas, interprets production to mean actual
production. Alternatively, the minority approach, followed by Oklahoma,
uses a capable of production theory, where a demonstrated capability to
produce survives termination under the habendum clause. 5
Lease termination automatically occurs where production is wholly
absent in the primary term. 6 If production occurs within the primary term
but ceases before its expiration, such cessation usually does not result in
lease termination. 7 However, if cessation occurs in the secondary term,
lease cancellation is likely, absent a savings clause to the contrary.8
When certain actions amount to cancellation under contractual terms, we
look to savings clauses. Savings clauses in an oil and gas lease exist to
circumvent lease cancellation for failure to satisfy agreed-upon terms
within the habendum clause. Common savings clauses include continuous
drilling clauses, dry-hole clauses, cessation of production clauses, and force
majeure.9
Cessation of production is both a doctrinal and clause-bound concept. 10
To avoid lease termination, the cessation must be temporary.11 Temporary
cessation arises where production completely ceases or ceases to produce in
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Wiser v. Enervest Operating, LLC, 803 F. Supp.2d 109, 118 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2 KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.8 (2021).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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paying quantities. 12 The classification of temporary cessation requires
courts to look at three factors: (1) the cause of cessation, (2) the time
required to reasonably restore production, and (3) the diligence exercised
by the lessee in restoring production. 13Additionally, courts consider
voluntariness.14 If the cessation is voluntary, the cessation is likely
classified as permanent and subject to forfeiture, despite satisfying other
factors that may indicate temporary cessation. 15 Economic considerations
are among the most frequently cited reasons for cessation. 16 Oil price
fluctuations may justify cessation under appropriate circumstances. 17
However, that determination may differ in capable-of-production states.
Oklahoma courts generally hold that where the capability of production
exists, a voluntary cessation may not terminate a lease. 18 Similarly,
Oklahoma courts have also upheld non-termination where production
ceased to provide paying quantities. 19 To solidify this rationale, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Pack v. Santa Fe Minerals signified that “[a]
lease continues in existence so long as the interruption of production in
paying quantities does not extend for a period longer than reasonable or
justifiable in light of the circumstances involved.” 20 Further, the court
maintains that “under no circumstances will cessation of production in
paying quantities ipso facto deprive the lessee of his extended-term
estate.”21
Force Majeure Generally
Force majeure is defined as non-performance by a party due to an
impediment beyond party control.22 Usually, such an impediment must bear
no reasonable expectation of occurrence or avoidance. 23 When a qualifying
circumstance manifests, parties are relieved of all or part of the
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. See also Cotner v. Warren, 1958 OK 208, 330 P.2d 217; Pack v. Santa Fe
Minerals, 1994 OK 23, 869 P.2d 323; Geyer Brothers Equip. Co., v. Standard Resources,
L.L.C., 2006 OK CIV APP 92, 140 P.3d 563.
19. Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 1979 OK 145, 604 P.2d 854.
20. 1994 OK 23, ¶ 10..
21. Id.
22. 14 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 77.1 (2020).
23. Id.
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performance of the outlined contract.24 Though force majeure is rooted in
common law, the events that bring about its application are rarely defined.
Instead, what constitutes a qualifying circumstance largely relies on the
express events set out in each contract and whether those circumstances are
foreseeable to both parties at the execution of the contract.25
Notice is a fundamental component to relieving non-performance. If a
party fails to give notice of an event detrimental to performance, then it
faces the possibility of relinquishing its right to assert force majeure in the
event of non-performance.26
Force majeure presents itself uniquely in oil and gas leases as compared
to any other ordinary contract. Given the unique nature of an oil and gas
lease, force majeure subsequently provides a specific function not
recognized in an ordinary contract.27 Oil and gas leases provide that
consideration is dependent upon the payment of royalties. 28 Payment of
royalties requires due diligence on behalf of the lessee. 29 The issue of
nonperformance in an oil and gas lease leads to a greater likelihood of
courts finding for the termination of the subsequent lease. 30 This is due to
the potential for irreparable harm suffered by the lessor if such performance
doesn’t provide said lessor with the benefit of leasing his land.31
Eugene Kuntz, renowned oil and gas law expert, defines three questions
with respect to a supposed force majeure event. 32 The first question is
whether the obligation or performance in question is covered by the force
majeure clause.33 The second question is whether the event that prevented
performance is described in the clause.34 Finally, the third question is
whether the event in question effectively prevented performance by the
lessee. 35 The first question is straightforward, as specific obligations that
are excused “necessarily excludes others”. 36 As to the second question,
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Sabine Corp. v. ONG Western, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157 (W.D. Okla. 1989).
27. Joan Teshima, Annotation, Gas and oil lease force majeure provisions: construction
and effect, 46 A.L.R.4th 976, § 2[a] (1986).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Kuntz, supra note 6, at § 53.5.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Kuntz suggests that the specific event must be noted within the clause to
apply.37 If the clause merely states excusal of performance due to a
circumstance “beyond the control of [the] lessee,” then unspecified events
may qualify. 38 The third question establishes in-part a but-for causation
test.39 Essentially, the question reads, but-for the event, would performance
have occurred? Further, the question requires the specific event to be the
cause of the non-performance. 40 Courts recognize that materiality is also an
important consideration.41 To excuse performance, an actual, material
hindrance must occur.42 Further, the performance must be prevented and
not merely made more expensive or inconvenient by the force majeure. 43
Courts consider force majeure as a modifier to both the primary and
secondary terms of a habendum clause within an oil and gas lease. 44 A
specific example of this consideration is seen in Beardslee v. Inflection
Energy, LLC.45 Here, producers sought to employ force majeure to extend
the primary term of their lease after the imposition of a hydraulic fracturing
moratorium. 46 The court found that the force majeure clause did not modify
the primary term of the lease. 47 Absent any express language to the
contrary, the habendum clause in the lease does not incorporate the force
majeure clause.48 As to the secondary term, the court held that the force
majeure provision did provide modification. 49 In this case, the force
majeure clause contained express language surrounding delay or
interruption in drilling or production. 50 Because no production occurred in
the primary term, any force majeure provision with language mentioning
cessation of production is inapplicable.51

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
2015).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Perlman v. Pioneer Ltd. P’Ship, 918 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Kuntz, supra note 6, at § 53.5.
Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 25 N.Y.3d 150, 158, 31 N.E.3d 80, 84 (N.Y.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 155.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/7

2021]

Reevaluating Force Majeure Within Oil & Gas Contracts

155

Force Majeure Events
Common law refrains from delineating precise events that constitute
force majeure. Instead, modern courts defer to the events expressly agreed
upon in individual contracts.52 When individual events are described within
the contracts, the common-law doctrine of force majeure should not
supersede the express, bargained-for terms.53 The most common
circumstances provoking force majeure contemplation are divisible into
three categories: market failure, acts of the government, and acts of God.
Market Failure
One of the most common yet largely controversial events circumscribed
in a contractual force majeure clause is non-performance due to market
failure. Our economy notoriously follows the systemic principles of a free
market. 54 Free-market economies are dependent upon private ownership
and production driven by competition.55 To meet the demand of individuals,
private companies produce and maintain supply, adjusting as necessary.
This system is not without flaws. When demand supersedes supply, or vice
versa, the system falls out of equilibrium, and thus requires corrective
measures.56 Such a shock can generate a market failure. 57
The oil and gas market is infamously volatile. 58 Both price and supply
change at drastic rates.59 These market shifts are especially impactful upon
production-oriented states.60 Taking volatility into account, issues
surrounding market failure occur enough to necessitate consideration in
force majeure clauses.61 Oil and gas industry participants routinely include
52. Perlman, 918 F.2d at 1248.
53. Id.
54. Tara Kibler, Capitalism, Socialism, or Fascism? A Guide to Economic Systems and
Ideologies, HEIN ONLINE (July 22, 2020), https://home.heinonline.org/blog/2020/07/
capitalism-socialism-or-fascism-a-guide-to-economic-systems-and-ideologies/.
55. Id.
56. Stanley Fischer, Supply Shocks, Wage Stickiness, and Accommodation, THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (May 1983), https://www.nber.org/papers/
w1119.pdf.
57. Oil Price Volatility: US Shale Has Reshaped the Oil Market, But Boom-Bust Cycles
Are Probably Here to Stay, COLUMBIA GLOBAL ENERGY DIALOGUES (December 14, 2016),
https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/Volatility%20Workshop
%20Summary.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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failure of market provisions within their leases to provide a remedy in the
event of market failure. 62 Courts tend to split on their interpretations of such
events within contractual clauses. Courts generally recognize that
incremental price increase alone does not suffice to exercise force
majeure.63 Nonproduction in an economic downturn usually does not satisfy
a declaration of force majeure either. 64 The reasoning behind that involves
the consideration of foreseeability. 65 However, if a contract contains an
express provision considering market failure, a different result likely
occurs.66
Acts of the Government
Another event routinely included within the ambit of force majeure
clauses concerns implications on behalf of the government. When the
government acts, by imposing certain restrictions, subsequent contractual
performance may be impacted. One of the biggest limitations to declaring
force majeure due to government action is whether the action existed at the
time of contract execution.67 If the action existed prior to executing the
contract, courts generally reject force majeure claims. 68 Alternatively, if the
action postdates the contract, courts have a greater inclination to uphold
force majeure claims.69An additional limitation to a claim against
government action is whether the non-performance due to government
action was beyond party control.70
Both foreign and domestic government action may invoke force majeure.
An example of foreign government action necessitating exercise of a
contractual force majeure provision is demonstrated in Kyocera Corp. v.
Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC.71 Here, the invocation of force majeure on
behalf of a seller in a take-or-pay solar contract spurred from allegations of
a foreign government illegally subsidizing its domestic companies. 72
62. Id.
63. Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc., 1988 OK 26, ¶ 13, 756 P.2d 1209, 1213.
64. TEC Olmos, LLC v. ConocoPhillips Co., 555 S.W.3d 176, 183 (Tex. App. 2018).
65. Id.
66. Kodiak 1981 Drilling P’Ship v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 736 S.W.2d 715 (Tex.
App. 1987).
67. Teshima, supra note 27, at § 8.
68. Id. at § 8[a].
69. Id. at § 8[b].
70. Id. at § 8[c].
71. Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC, 313 Mich. App. 437, 886 N.W.2d
445 (2015).
72. Id. at 442.
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Additionally, the seller alleged that given the subsidies, the companies
participated in large-scale dumping, effectively flooding the market. 73
Ultimately, the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that conduct causing
a market downturn for a take-or-pay contract cannot suffice for relieving a
party of contractual obligation.74 The court’s rationale rests upon both the
nature of the contract and the bargaining power each party had with respect
to contemplating governmental action. 75
Courts have held that government orders imposing a moratorium on
hydraulic fracturing do not constitute a force majeure event. 76 This holding
was the result when a landowner brought action against oil and gas lessees
after governor David Patterson imposed a directive effectuating a
moratorium on fracking within the state of New York. 77 The lessees
contended that the fracking ban hindered the development of the mineral
formation.78 Further, lessees alleged that fracking was the only viable
method for obtaining the minerals within the formation. 79 Conversely,
landowners, the parties pursuing the action in court, maintained that
traditional drilling methods existed, thereby contesting that the fracking ban
cannot constitute a force majeure event. 80 Ultimately, the court upheld the
landowners’ position, finding that New York’s fracking moratorium,
though it may be factually consistent with a force majeure event, did not
extend the disputed leases. 81 Additionally, the court indicated that if drilling
specifications had been contracted for, the result could be different. 82 The
results have been consistent in other cases dealing with force majeure
claims due to New York’s fracking ban. In Beardslee v. Inflection Energy,
LLC, the New York Court of Appeals held that a force majeure claim based
on the state moratorium did not modify an oil and gas lease in its primary
term.83

73.
74.
75.
76.
2012).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 455.
Aukema v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 904 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210 (N.D.N.Y.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 210.
Id.
Beardslee, 25 N.Y.3d at 158.
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“Acts of God”
Congress, through legislation, routinely defines an act of God as “an
unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an
exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character the effects of which could
not have been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or
foresight.”84 Courts typically assess extraordinary phenomena in three
parts.85 The phenomenon must be (1) abnormal or unusual in occurrence,
(2) a force strictly of nature with no human assistance or influence, and (3)
of such severity that human prudence or precaution could not have avoided
the damage thereby caused. 86 An act of God signifies that an individual is
not liable “for injuries or damages caused by an act that falls within the
meaning of the term ‘act of God.’” 87 However, this claim of relief is not
automatic.88 Instead, the “proponent bears the burden of proof.” 89 Further,
the established defense then becomes a question of fact, left in the hands of
the fact finder.90 It is pivotal to recognize that acts of God, unlike an
inevitable accident, lack a component of human agency. 91 On this
contention, some courts only consider acts of God absent fault of man, as
the presence of one “excludes the other.”92
Courts generally recognize that natural disasters and extreme weather
conditions can constitute an act of God. 93 This presupposition requires that
the act was unforeseeable and unanticipated. 94 If the act is foreseeable, there
is a requirement to exercise due care towards prevention efforts. 95
Causation is also an important consideration when determining acts of God.
Courts generally maintain that human interference or influence must be
absent, even if the event is otherwise considered an act of God. 96 This was
the holding in American National Red Cross v. Vinton Roofing Co., where a
roofer’s waterproofing measures added a human interference component to
84. 33 U.S.C.A § 2701(1) (2018). See also, 42 U.S.C.A § 9601(1).
85. 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 319 § 1 (1989).
86. Id.
87. 1 AM. JUR. 2D ACT OF GOD § 3 (2021).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 1 AM. JUR. 2D ACT OF GOD § 2 (2021).
92. Cox v. Vernieuw, 604 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo. 1980).
93. Michael Faure et al., Industrial Accidents, Natural Disasters and “Acts of God”, 43
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 383, 392 (2015).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 404.
96. Am. Nat. Red Cross v. Vinton Roofing Co., 629 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C 2009).
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an otherwise force-majeure-protected rainstorm.97 Ultimately, the court
barred recovery due to human agency, despite the rainstorm factually
representing a force majeure event. 98
In addition to events like natural disasters, illness or death may also
constitute an act of God.99 Like natural disasters and weather-related events,
asserting illness as an act of God defense requires a showing the event was
both unforeseeable and unavoidable. 100 Illness as an act of God defense,
however, is rarely invoked. And finally, courts refrain from classifying
saltwater seepage and subsequent shut-in orders as force majeure events
requiring remedial action. 101
Introduction of COVID-19 & Force Majeure
COVID-19’s Impact on Domestic Oil and Gas Industry
On April 20, 2020, the price of oil went negative for the first time in
history. 102 This unprecedented drop marked the price of a barrel of West
Texas Intermediate at minus $37.63, the lowest recorded price ever. 103 This
drastic drop was a product of storage concerns. 104 Given state-imposed
lockdowns and global travel restrictions at the time, oil demand virtually
collapsed. 105 Decreased demand in conjunction with increased output
created a substantial supply shock.106
Following the crash of crude oil prices, domestic producers began to call
on state legislative action for relief. 107 Oklahoma was the first state to
respond to the requested relief. 108 On April 22, 2020, the Oklahoma
Corporation Commission issued an emergency order effectuating
97. Id. at 10.
98. Id.
99. 1 AM. JUR. 2D ACT OF GOD § 6 (2021).
100. Id.
101. Teshima, supra note 27 at §9[b].
102. Andrew Walker, US oil prices turn negative as demand dries up, BBC NEWS (Apr.
21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-52350082.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Liz Hampton, Reeling Oklahoma oil producers win right to keep leases while wells
shut, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-usa-oklahomacuts/reeling-oklahoma-oil-producers-win-right-to-keep-leases-while-wells-shutidUSKCN2242DR.
108. Id.
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permissible cessation of production. 109 The decision allowed Oklahoma oil
companies to consider unprofitable production as economic waste, which
may shield producers from losing their leases that would otherwise be
cancelled.110 The New Mexico State Land Office followed in Oklahoma’s
footsteps by passing similar emergency measures. 111
COVID-19’s impact also extended to domestic drilling. At the end of
2020, domestic output of crude oil fell well below pre-pandemic levels at
roughly 2.1 million barrels per day. 112 The domestic output drop reflects
cost cuts made by producers in light of COVID-19. 113 COVID-19’s impact
resulted in numerous companies declaring bankruptcy, employee layoffs,
and ultimately a resurgence of OPEC as the top global market player. 114
COVID-19’s Impact on Foreign Oil and Gas Industry
COVID-19’s impact caused great, international concern in the oil and
gas industry. Much of the international impact stemmed from China. In
February 2020, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
commenced the issuance of force majeure certificates.115 In March 2020,
PetroChina, China’s leading gas supplier, declared force majeure to
suspend natural gas imports.116 The decision to suspend imports ultimately
resulted in the delay of multiple cargoes due to their inability to operate
some of their liquefied natural gas terminals at full capacity. 117Additionally,
in February 2020, China National Offshore Oil Corp (“CNOOC”) declared

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
David Wethe, Oil Drilling in U.S. Ends Fraught 2020 at Pre-Shale Levels,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-1230/oil-drilling-in-u-s-ends-a-fraught-2020-at-pre-shale-era-levels.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. CCPIT Provides COVID-19 Force Majeure Certificates and Other Services, CHINA
COUNCIL FOR THE PROMOTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Mar. 13, 2020), https://en.ccpit.
org/infoById/40288117668b3d9b0170d2952a7f0799/2.
116. Chen Aizhu & Jessica Jaganathan, PetroChina suspends some gas contracts as
coronavirus hits demand, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/uspetrochina-gas-exclusive/petrochina-suspends-some-gas-contracts-as-coronavirus-hitsdemand-sources-idUSKBN20S10W.
117. Stephen Stapczynski, CNOOC refuses LNG cargoes, declaring force majeure over
coronavirus, WORLD OIL (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/2/6/cnoocrefuses-lng-cargoes-declaring-force-majeure-over-coronavirus.
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force majeure on liquefied natural gas deliveries from three suppliers. 118
CNOOC’s declaration carried great weight because CNOOC operates
roughly half of China’s liquefied natural gas terminals.119 On the receiving
end of CNOOC’s force majeure declaration, two of Europe’s largest energy
companies, Shell and Total, rejected CNOOC’s pleas.120 Both Shell and
Total’s justifications for rejection came from concern over the possibility of
Chinese firms exiting long-term contracts.121
A similar situation occurred in India. In March 2020, Indian liquefied
natural gas importers issued force majeure notices to suppliers. 122 LNG
firms cited a lack of domestic gas demand and lack of port operations due
to the spread of the COVID-19 as reasons for issuing notices. 123 Gujarat
State Petroleum Corp (“GSPC”), one of India’s largest oil firms, issued
force majeure notices to its liquefied natural gas suppliers due to
overwhelmingly full storage tanks and depleted domestic demand.124
On the domestic front, in April 2020, Continental Resources declared
force majeure on at least one of its contracts to a fuel producer. 125 This
118. China’s CNOOC declares force majeure on some prompt LNG deliveries, Reuters
(February 6, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/china-health-lng-cnooc/chinas-cnoocdeclares-force-majeure-on-some-prompt-lng-deliveries-sources-idUSL4N2A61RX.
119. Jessica Jaganathan & Chen Aizhu, China’s biggest liquefied gas importer suspends
some contracts as virus spreads, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-china-health-lng-cnooc/chinas-biggest-liquefied-gas-importer-suspends-some-contractsas-virus-spreads-idUSKBN2000UN.
120. Stephen Stapczynski, Shell, Total reject China’s force majeure on LNG shipments,
WORLD OIL (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.worldoil.com/news/2020/2/7/shell-total-rejectchina-s-force-majeure-on-lng-shipments.
121. Bate Felix & Jessica Jaganathan, France’s Total rejects force majeure notice from
Chinese LNG buyer, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chinahealth-total/frances-total-rejects-force-majeure-notice-from-chinese-lng-buyeridUSKBN2001XQ.
122. .Nidhi Verma & Jessica Jaganathan, Indian LNG importers issue force majeure
notices as gas demand slumps, REUTERS, (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/
article/india-lng-imports/update-3-indian-lng-importers-issue-force-majeure-notices-as-gasdemand-slumps-sources-idUSL4N2BI2YF.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Jennifer A. Dlouhy & Rachel Adams-Heard, Continental Resources declares force
majeure on some oil deliveries, WORLD OIL (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.worldoil.com/
news/2020/4/24/continental-resources-declares-force-majeure-on-some-oildeliveries#:~:text=Continental%20Resources%20declares%20force%20majeure%20on%20s
ome%20oil%20deliveries,-By%20Jennifer%20A&text=WASHINGTON%20(Bloomberg)%
20%2D%2DShale%20explorer%20Continental%20Resources%20Inc.&text=In%20the%20
document%2C%20Continental%20said,at%20negative%20prices%20constitutes%20waste.
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declaration came a day after the negative oil price plunge. Continental cited
the pandemic as its reason for its subsequent declaration and that they
“couldn’t have foreseen the dramatic rout caused by the coronavirus
outbreak” and that “selling oil at negative prices constitutes waste.” 126
Continental Resources is the largest oil and gas producer in North
Dakota.127 As a result of the ongoing pandemic, however, Continental
Resources suspended all drilling in North Dakota, shut-in wells, and
ultimately issued force majeure notice. 128
Introduction to Issue: Can COVID-19 Trigger Force Majeure
in an Oil and Gas Contract?
Whether COVID-19 serves to excuse an oil and gas lease depends on
answering Kuntz’s three questions: (1) whether the obligation or
performance is covered by an applicable force majeure clause, (2) whether
COVID-19, or pandemic related language is described within the force
majeure clause, and (3) whether performance was effectively prevented by
COVID-19. 129
Is the Performance or Obligation Covered?
Determining performance within a lease is straightforward. Essentially,
Kuntz’s first question boils down to two elements: (1) whether a force
majeure provision exists; and (2) whether the contract describes the
performance or obligation at issue. 130 Given force majeure provisions
typically exist within oil and gas contracts, the first element is likely
satisfied.131 Absent a force majeure provision, parties may retain alternate
relief. The following section discusses such relief at length. Upon
determining the first element, the second element is simple. If the
performance in question is bargained-for and precisely outlined within the
126. Jennifer A Dlouhy & Rachel Adams-Herd, Negative Oil Has Hamm’s Continental
Invoking ‘Act of God’ Clause, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2020-04-23/hamm-s-shale-explorer-invokes-force-majeure-citing-negative-oil.
127. Liz Hampton et al., U.S. oil firm Continental draws anger with decision to cancel
sales, REUTERS (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-continental-resourcesshale-north-dak/u-s-oil-firm-continental-draws-anger-with-decision-to-cancel-salesidUSKCN22631U.
128. Id.
129. See Kuntz, supra note 6 at §53.5 (discussing the analysis of three questions in
determining force majeure).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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four corners of the contract, asserting force majeure is possible, therefore
prompting discussion of the second question.
Are Pandemic Related Terms Within the Force Majeure Provision?
Pandemics, epidemics, and other related global events sometimes surface
within contracts. Whether COVID-19 is a force majeure event largely
depends on bargained-for terms within an individual contract.132 When
contracts expressly contain pandemic considerations, the court’s
interpretation is simple, but this is rarely the case. 133 Instead, it may be
permissible to measure COVID-19’s impact on typical force majeure events
or a catchall provision, if applicable. To determine whether COVID-19
modifies standard force majeure events requires this section to analyze
COVID-19’s relevance to (1) market failure, (2) government action, and (3)
acts of God.
COVID-19 & Market Failure
Undoubtedly, COVID-19 substantially impacts global markets. Among
the most impacted is the global market for oil and gas. Drastic reductions in
the international energy demand coupled with a flood of storage concerns
fueled a frenzied producer panic.
Asserting force majeure in contemplation of market failure will likely
face difficulty in court. Though it is undisputed that a global pandemic
weighs substantially on domestic and foreign markets, such weight isn’t
given much deference in court. Absent express enumeration of an economic
downturn as a force majeure event, courts are unlikely to find for excusal of
performance. This is especially true where the applicable force majeure
clause enumerates multiple force majeure events. 134 Additionally, courts
will not presume changes in economic conditions as a force majeure event
where it is not enumerated. 135
Whether COVID-19’s market impact furnishes parties with a solid basis
to mitigate performance depends largely on whether their contract
contemplated an economic downturn as a force majeure event. If the
contract contains language indicating an economic downturn as a
132. Sun Operating Ltd. v. Holt, 984 S.W.2d 277, 283 (Tex. App. 1998) (specific terms
control).
133. Andrew A. Schwartz, Contracts and COVID-19, 73 STAN L. REV. ONLINE 48, 56-57
(2020).
134. Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. v. Essar Steel Minnesota, LLC, 871 F. Supp. 2d
843, 853 (D. Minn. 2012).
135. Id.
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consideration in the invocation of force majeure, then the likelihood of
potential contractual relief increases. Additionally, the enumeration of
market considerations generally spares parties from having to prove
foreseeability. This holding is reflected in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp, where the court stated, “when the promisor has
anticipated a particular event by specifically providing for it in a contract,
he should be relieved of liability for the occurrence of such event regardless
of whether it was foreseeable.”136 Absent such an enumeration, the
likelihood of success based on economic considerations is low. However,
that does not mean that it is not possible.
COVID-19 & Government Action
Is government action relating to COVID-19 sufficient to invoke force
majeure claims? Again, that depends on several factors. A government
order, construed as a “stay-at-home order,” likely classifies as an act of the
government subject to force majeure consideration. Beginning in March
2020, government officials commenced statewide shutdowns. In Oklahoma,
Governor Kevin Stitt issued an executive order effectively closing nonessential businesses for an indefinite period throughout all seventy-seven
state counties.137 Within this directive, Governor Stitt collated essential
businesses to remain open during the shutdown period. 138 Various sectors
like chemical, commercial and professional services, construction and
infrastructure, energy, healthcare and social assistance, are among
“essential industries” precluded from a shutdown. 139
Under Governor Stitt’s executive order, energy is an essential industry in
Oklahoma.140 Within the sector, functions like mining, oil and gas
extraction, pipeline transportation, electrical equipment manufacturing, and
machinery manufacturing are deemed essential, thereby retaining the ability
to remain open during a shutdown period. 141

136. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 992 (5th Cir.
1976).
137. Okla. Exec. Order No. 2020-20 3rd Amended (July 30, 2020), https://www.sos.
ok.gov/documents/executive/1953.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Oklahoma Essential Industries List, OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (July
27,
2020),
https://www.okcommerce.gov/wp-content/uploads/Oklahoma-EssentialIndustries-List.pdf.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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A similar result ensued in Texas. In March 2020, Texas Governor Greg
Abbott issued an executive order closing non-essential businesses. 142 Under
the executive order, Sectors like essential retail, healthcare, energy, and
transportation were essential, thereby allowing operational functionality
with heightened safety restrictions. 143
Like Governor Stitt’s Executive Order, Governor Abbott’s executive
order classified energy as an essential sector.144 Within the energy sector,
workers involved in electricity, petroleum, natural gas, and water and
wastewater generally retained work during the shutdown. 145 Under the
executive order, oil and gas exploration and production activities, like
drilling, extraction, production, refining, and transportation were essential
and were allowed to remain in operation. 146
Thus, whether a government directive addressing COVID-19 classifies
as a force majeure event depends on the industry in question. In re Hitz
Restaurant Group demonstrates how non-essential businesses have a
demonstrated likelihood to invoke success force majeure. 147 This is due to
the restriction on in-person gatherings mandated by state executive
orders.148 In Illinois, non-essential business owners, due to the stateimposed restrictions, shut down businesses and subsequently sought relief
due to the inability to pay rent to respective landlords. 149 The court
ultimately granted a partial excusal of contractual performance. 150 This is
because the restaurant industry, through executive order, was not
completely shut-down, but rather drastically limited to take-out and offpremises consumption.151 In sum, the survivable force majeure claim
consisted of a valuation of space usable in light of state-imposed
restrictions.152 The court determined that the restaurant owner was not liable
for rent payment reflecting the square footage of the restaurant implicated
142. Id.
143. Briana Edwards, LIST: All the essential businesses that will remain open during the
stay-home-work-safe order, KPRC 2 NEWS (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.click2houston.
com/news/local/2020/03/24/these-are-the-16-essential-business-sectors-that-will-remainopen-during-the-stay-home-work-safe-order/.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. In re Hitz Restaurant Group, 616 B.R. 374 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2020).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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by the shut-down order.153 Instead, the business owner was liable for
twenty-five percent of their rent, as that percentage signified the useable
space within their restaurant.154 The remaining majority percentage
reflected dine-in space, subject to shut-down limitations.155
Therefore, contracts in non-essential industries likely face more success
when asserting force majeure. Because essential industry, like oil and gas,
is shielded from shutdown risk, unlike non-essential industry, they are less
likely to succeed.
COVID-19 & Acts of God
Is COVID-19 an act of God? Some public officials seem to think so.
Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt thought so, and on his belief, sent a letter
to President Donald Trump requesting that he declare the pandemic an act
of God.156 Stitt sent the prayer for relief after the sharp decline in oil and
gas prices.157 Stitt claimed that such a determination is for the “narrow
purpose of protecting the[] producers from actions to cancel leases held by
production as a result of production stoppage.” 158 No subsequent
declaration from President Trump followed from this prayer. 159
The incorporation of COVID-19 as an act of God recently began to
surface among some state courts. In New York, courts have defined
COVID-19 as a natural disaster like an act of God. 160 Here, courts
contemplated COVID-19 as a natural disaster under a force majeure
insurance provision. 161 In reaching their conclusion, the court turned to
dictionary definitions of natural disasters. 162 The court, in accordance with
Black’s Law Dictionary, defined “natural” as “brought by nature as
opposed to artificial means,” and “disaster” as [a] calamity; a catastrophic

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Kathryn Watson, Oklahoma Governor calls on Trump to declare virus “act of God”
to help oil and gas producers, CBS NEWS (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
kevin-stitt-oklahoma-governor-trump-declare-coronavirus-act-of-god-oil-gas/.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. JN Contemporary Art LLC v. Phillips Auctioneers LLC, No. 20CV4370 (DLC),
2020 WL 7405262, at *7 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 16, 2020).
161. Id.
162. Id.
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emergency.”163 On this reasoning, the court determined that “by any
measure, the COVID-19 pandemic fits those definitions.”164
Catch-All Provisions
If the applicable force majeure clause refrains from mentioning
pandemic-related terms, does a broad, catchall provision exist? Catchall
provisions provide relief without enumeration of specific events that qualify
for invocation of force majeure. Catchall provisions are usually
encapsulated in a phrase such as the following: “any other clause beyond
control of the respective party.”165 Though catchall provisions serve to
encompass more circumstances for exercising force majeure, courts remain
hesitant to interpret them liberally. 166 Instead, courts look to events
reasonably related by nature or within similar circumstances to the listed
force majeure events within the contract when deciding whether an event
not circumscribed renders excuse of contractual performance. 167
Black’s Law Dictionary defines foreseeability as “[t]he quality of being
reasonably anticipatable.”168 Foreseeability is a critical component to force
majeure when a claimant is relying upon a catchall provision. Courts
generally require a showing of unforeseeability to relieve contractual
performance. 169 Alternatively, when asserting force majeure under an event
directly listed within the provision, courts are split in incorporating an
element of foreseeability. Oklahoma courts generally read foreseeability as
a loose requirement, meaning that where foreseeability isn’t required by
contract, Oklahoma courts refrain from imposing a strict foreseeability
element.170 Instead, Oklahoma courts favor a showing of control rather than
a foreseeability requirement.171
Whether a pandemic like COVID-19 is foreseeable is up for debate, as it
has yet to be judicially determined. On one hand, many argue that
pandemics serve as a classic example of a force majeure event. 172 On the
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)).
Id.
Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Markets, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 900, 903, 519 N.E.2d 295(1987).
Id.
Id.
Foreseeability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
TEC Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 176.
Sabine, 725 F. Supp. at 1170.
Id.
Andrew A. Schwartz, COVID-19: Impossible Contracts and Force Majeure,
COLUMBIA: THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 11, 2020), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2020/08/11/covid-19-impossible-contracts-and-force-majeure/.
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other hand, some argue that given various outbreaks in history, like SARS,
or the Avian Flu, a pandemic is relatively foreseeable in its occurrence,
therefore failing to account for it within one’s contract amounts to
waiver.173 Whether one’s approach is the former or latter, timing is still an
important consideration. If a party contracted pre-pandemic, a claim of
force majeure absent inclusion of pandemic-related language within a
contract likely makes a better case for exercising force majeure, as opposed
to parties contracting amidst the pandemic.
Additional Considerations & Contract Choice
While it is imperative to consider the lease language within the contract,
other considerations worthy of examination manifest. Courts generally
recognize that the application of force majeure is dependent upon the
express terms outlined in individual agreements.174 Courts tend to refrain
from acting as gatekeepers in this realm to avoid rewriting contracts or
interpreting agreements beyond the parties’ intentions. 175
Choice of law is among one of the most relevant considerations when
determining force majeure. State court interpretation varies with respect to
defining certain force majeure events, notice requirements, and
foreseeability requirements. Undoubtedly, state courts tend to interpret
force majeure clauses differently based on their own established bodies of
case law. However, most courts have an overarching tendency to interpret
force majeure on a per-lease basis.176
Type of contract is also a relevant consideration when determining
whether to exercise force majeure. Base Contracts for the Sale and Purchase
of Natural Gas, or NAESB Contracts, prepared by the North American
Energy Standards Board, are among the most frequently used within the
industry, given their standard uniformity. 177 Standard NAESB contracts
consist of three parts: (1) a base contract containing terms and conditions,
(2) a transaction confirmation form, allowing parties to add details specific
to their agreements, and (3) a special provision addendum, which allows for
173. Melvin See, Wuhan Coronavirus (2019-nCOV) – A Frustrating Event?, JD SUPRA
(Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/wuhan-coronavirus-2019-ncov-a54336/.
174. Sun Operating, 984 S.W.2d at 283.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Blake Baxter, Natural Gas Contracts 101, WASB: WISCONSIN SCHOOL NEWS (Sept.
2016),
https://wasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Natural_Gas_Contracts_101_Sept_
2016.pdf.
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modification of the standard terms and conditions. 178 The distinction in the
type of contract spurs from the idea that force majeure may be treated
differently among various contracts. The following is an example of a force
majeure provision in a standard NAESB contract:
Force Majeure shall include but not be limited to the following:
(i) physical events such as acts of God, landslides, lightning,
earthquakes, fires, storms or storm warnings, such as
hurricanes113, which result in evacuation of the affected area,
floods, washouts, explosions, breakage or accident or necessity
of repairs to machinery or equipment or lines of pipe114; (ii)
weather related events affecting an entire geographic region,
such as low temperatures which cause freezing115 or failure of
wells or lines of pipe; (iii) interruption of firm transportation
and/or storage by Transporters; (iv) acts of others such as strikes,
lockouts or other industrial disturbances, riots, sabotage,
insurrections or wars; and (v) governmental actions such as
necessity for compliance with any court order, law, statute,
ordinance, or regulation promulgated by a governmental
authority having jurisdiction. Seller and Buyer shall make
reasonable efforts to avoid the adverse impacts of a Force
Majeure and to resolve the event or occurrence once it has
occurred in order to resume performance. 179
Further, the force majeure provision within a standard NAESB contract
includes notice as a subcomponent to exercising force majeure.180
Texas courts interpreted the standard NAESB force majeure provision
above in Virginia Power Energy Marketing, Inc. v. Apache Corp. Here,
Apache invoked force majeure after hurricanes Katrina and Rita damaged
the production pipeline and prevented their contractual performance. 181
Given significant damage to the pipeline associated with the contract,
Apache notified Virginia Power of its inability to deliver gas. 182 Upon
receiving notice, Virginia Power requested Apache’s gas delivery at an
178. Hess Corp v. ENI Petroleum US, LLC, 435 N.J. Super. 39, 42, 86 A.3d 723, 724
(App. Div. 2014).
179. Base Contract for Sale and Purchase of Natural Gas, NORTH AMERICAN ENERGY
STANDARDS BOARD https://naesb.org/pdf/cs012102w2.pdf (last visited May 19, 2021).
180. Id.
181. Virginia Power Energy Mktg., Inc. v. Apache Corp., 297 S.W.3d 397, 402 (Tex.
App. 2009).
182. Id. at 401.
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alternate location, but Apache declined. 183 Virginia Power subsequently
sought judicial action, alleging that Apache failed to use reasonable efforts
to deliver under the contractual terms.184 Ultimately, the court found for
partial excusal under the NAESB contract relying on its base terms. 185
At the outset, force majeure also commonly requires a control element. 186
To prevail, the event must be beyond the control of either party.187 When
the asserting party possesses control over the event, a force majeure
assertion is likely unsuccessful.188 NAESB force majeure clauses also
require a lack of causal nexus.189 The standard NAESB contract signifies
force majeure to not be “any cause not reasonably within the control of the
party claiming suspension.”190 The narrow construction of force majeure
provisions within NAESB contracts serves to provide a higher bar to
recovery.
Question One Conclusion
The inclusion of pandemic-related terms within a lease serves to induce a
simplistic avenue of relief. Though rare in the meantime, it may be
increasingly common to include express terms incorporating such terms in
future contract drafting. Absent explicit language or enumeration, it
remains possible to incorporate COVID-19 under certain blanket force
majeure events. Though COVID-19 undoubtedly impacts the market, a
claim of force majeure under a market failure theory may not lead to
contractual relief.
COVID-19 and subsequent government action as a force majeure event
may carry a greater likelihood of survivability. This contention, however,
largely depends on the industry affected by the government action and
subsequent restrictions imposed thereof. For an essential industry, like oil
and gas, government action may not give rise to a successful invocation of a
force majeure claim. This is because the oil and gas industry, unlike a nonessential industry, does not face severe operational restrictions resulting
from government directives, like stay-at-home orders. In fact, many
industry-related operational facilities remained open during state-wide
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kuntz, supra note 6, at §53.5.
Id.
Hess Corp, 435 N.J. Super. at 42.
Id.
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shutdowns. However, a different outcome may ensue when raising a claim
within an industry classified as non-essential.
Asserting COVID-19 as an act of God may also give rise to a potentially
successful claim. Though litigation surrounding this issue is sparse at this
point, as we continue to live in the age of COVID-19, more issues
surrounding this precise determination may follow.
When explicit enumeration of pandemics-related language does not exist,
and blanket force majeure events, like acts of the government, cannot
provide a solid basis for reliving contractual performance, catchall
provisions may remedy non-performance relating to COVID-19. This
statement, however, relies upon the existence of an applicable catchall
provision within the contract. Further, whether COVID-19 could fall under
a catchall provision depends on if it’s reasonably related to other
enumerated terms within the force majeure clause. Absent a showing of
reasonable relation, COVID-19 may not serve to defend non-performance
under a catchall provision, as courts refrain from liberal interpretation.
Other considerations serve an equally important function in determining
the applicability of force majeure. Choice of law and type of contract are
also important considerations in deciding whether to invoke force majeure
due to COVID-19. After considering these factors and determining whether
COVID-19 serves as an applicable force majeure event, we can then ask the
final question: whether COVID-19 effectively prevents performance.
Did COVID-19 Effectively Prevent Performance?
The third question in this analysis centers around whether COVID-19
effectively prevented performance. There mere existence of a pandemic
will not shield parties from non-performance. 191 Instead, parties must prove
an element of causation as to the event and their non-performance. 192
Simply put, parties must ask: but-for the pandemic, would contractual
performance occur? This essentially develops into a but-for causation test.
The existence of the pandemic, without more, will not likely excuse
performance even if the agreement includes pandemic-related terms. To
prevail, parties must show that the pandemic effectively prevented
contractual performance. For example, if parties were unable to fulfill lease
obligations due to a restrictive government action barring oil and gas
operations in the wake of the pandemic, parties would then have a chance at
asserting force majeure to relieve lease obligations. However, this
191. Kuntz, supra note 6 at §53.5.
192. Id.
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doomsday situation remains highly unlikely considering the classification
of oil and gas as an essential industry.
Alternative Relief
Absent an applicable force majeure provision, parties may retain
alternate avenues of relief. The suggested methods of relief rely both on
common law and statute. The statute-based approach depends on the usage
of the Uniform Commercial Code. The two common-law approaches are
the Doctrine of Frustration and the Doctrine of Impracticability.
UCC §2-615
The Uniform Commercial Code provides a method of relief absent an
express force majeure clause. The Code provides that a seller is excused
“from timely delivery of goods contracted for, where his performance has
become commercially impracticable because of unforeseen supervening
circumstances not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
contracting.”193 In order for the UCC provisions to apply, the contract must
adhere to the requisite standards, that is, the contract’s purpose being for the
commercial sale of goods.194 Like contractual force majeure, statutory force
majeure adheres to the same standards. Notice remains an important
consideration when claiming relief.195 Similarly, an exercise of due
diligence to mitigate the circumstance is also a thoughtful consideration
when claiming relief from non-performance. 196 Contractual relief cannot be
granted to a party that fails to exercise due care. 197It is important to note
that contractual terms do in fact trump the employment of the relevant UCC
provisions.198
Like contractual force majeure, statutory force majeure is limited in its
usage. The UCC dictates that changes in price or cost alone cannot
substantiate the usage of statutory force majeure. 199 Market failure is also
considered within the UCC.200 Market failure, like price fluctuations, don’t
warrant relief, as market shifting constitutes a “business risk which business

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

U.C.C. §2-615 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2020).
Id. at Comment 1.
Id. at Comment 9.
Id. at Comment 5.
Id.
Id. at Comment 8.
Id. at Comment 4.
Id.
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contracts made at fixed prices are intended to cover.” 201 However, drastic
and unprecedented circumstances may render a different outcome. The
UCC contemplates circumstances of severe shortages of supply in the event
of an unforeseen shutdown of major sources of supply. 202 In the event of
such a shutdown, the seller must be barred from procuring materials
requisite to one’s performance.203 Further considerations as to weight of
non-performance must be made. Where the failure to deliver only amounts
to a small portion of the contract, the failure is not fully excused. 204 Instead,
the contracting party must fulfill their contractual obligations to the extent
allowed by the supervening event.205 Oklahoma codified the UCC statutory
force majeure provision in 1961.206 Subsequent case law provides similar
results to contractual force majeure. Relating to oil and gas contracts,
Oklahoma courts have held that statutory force majeure is inapplicable
where a substantial deviation between contract prices and the market value
of gas beyond control of the parties exists. 207 Circumstances like increased
government regulation on the market that render a contract more difficult to
fulfill do not justify statutory-imposed relief, because government
regulation, Oklahoma courts conclude, is foreseeable as a matter of law. 208
States like Texas consider the applicability of the UCC as a gap-filler in
interpreting force majeure.209 However, the protection awarded by the usage
of the UCC is limited. 210 The protection afforded by the usage of the UCC
must not be used to vary bargained-for contractual terms.211
Whether UCC §2-615 is applicable depends again upon the contract in
question and the party seeking to assert statutory force majeure. The
language of §2-615 indicates applicability to parties represented as sellers
rather than buyers. However, commentary within the statutory provision
may indicate the extension of protection to buyers.212 As to subject-matter
applicability, COVID-19 may serve as a defense to non-performance if the
contract in question meets the requirements of applicable UCC standards. If
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at Comment 7.
Id. at Comment 11.
12A O.S. §2-615 (OSCN 2021).
Sabine, 725 F. Supp. at 1157.
Id. at 1174.
TEC Olmos, 555 S.W.3d at 181.
Jon-T Chems., Inc. v. Freeport Chem. Co., 704 F.2d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1983).
Id.
U.C.C. § 2-16 at Comment 9.
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the contract surrounds the sale of commercial goods, the determination then
becomes whether performance is commercially impracticable because of
COVID-19. Further, showings of both notice and due diligence must be
proven in accord with the code. Non-performance resulting from COVID19-related government action may face a higher bar to recovery. This is due
to the notion that difficulty placed upon the market by government action is
outlaid as foreseeable, and a mere increase in difficulty to perform does not
excuse performance under the UCC. However, Market Contentions and
COVID-19 under UCC §2-615 face similar difficulties in defending nonperformance under contractual force majeure. Ultimately, where a contract
refrains from the inclusion of a force majeure provision, statutory force
majeure under UCC may act as a vessel to mitigate performance or lack
thereof.
Doctrine of Impracticability
The doctrine of impracticability refers to nonperformance without fault
where such performance is impracticable. 213 The Second Restatement of
Contracts defines existing impracticability as:
[w]here, at the time a contract is made, a party’s performance
under it is impracticable without his fault because of a fact of
which he has no reason to know and the non-existence of which
is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no duty to
render that performance arises, unless the language or
circumstances indicate the contrary.214
Courts have interpreted this excerpt from the restatement to reflect three
components requisite to determining existing impracticability. 215 The first
element asks whether there was fault.216 The second element asks whether
the occurrence was foreseeable.217 Finally, the third element asks whether
assumption of the risk is present, effectively barring recovery. 218 Usually,
the timing of the circumstance giving rise to impracticability is difficult to
determine. 219 To determine impracticability, the Restatement offers a two213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266 (1981).
214. Id.
215. Sunflower Elec. Co-op, Inc., v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 131, 138, 638
P.2d 963, 969 (1981).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 172.
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factor analysis.220 The first factor asks whether the affected party knew or
had reason to know of the factors contributing to impracticability. 221 To
assert impracticability, the asserting party must lack formidable awareness
of causal circumstances.222 The second factor asks whether the
impracticability prevented duty from arising or whether an arisen duty
should be worthy of discharge.223 The latter of the two distinctions awards
restitution to remedy partial performance after the discovery of
impracticability. 224
Impracticability is usually measured in objective terms. Objective
impracticability may relieve performance whereas subjective
impracticability, without more, may not.225 Common-law impracticability
in oil and gas contractual dealings usually operates together with
commercial impracticability within the UCC. In Sunflower Elec. Co-Op v.
Tomlinson Oil Co., parties sought excusal of performance under theories of
impossibility and impracticability after failing to deliver gas agreed upon. 226
The court in Sunflower contemplated the interrelatedness of the
Restatement’s definition of the doctrine of impracticability and commercial
impracticability within the UCC.227 Ultimately, the court determined that
impracticability in this case was merely subjective, therefore diminishing
excusal of contractual performance.228
Whether COVID-19 serves to excuse contract performance on the
grounds of impracticability depends not only on the foreseeability of the
circumstances involved but also the objectivity of impracticability as
determined by the court. If performance is hindered by COVID-19, the
party seeking relief under impracticability must determine: (1) whether
their performance, or lack thereof, is attributable to their fault, (2) whether
the occurrence of COVID-19 and its impact on performance was
foreseeable, and (3) whether an assumption of risk was included within the
contract. If a party’s performance failed to occur through no fault of their
own, COVID-19’s impact on the performance was unforeseeable, and no
assumption of any risk associated with the performance was apparent from
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id. at Comment a.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sunflower Electric, 638 P.2d at 970.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 969.
Id. at 964.
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the agreement, then a potential defense may give rise to relieving
contractual non-performance.
Frustration of Purpose
Frustration of purpose is also a potential avenue of relief. Frustration of
Purpose is a common-law doctrine predicated on contractual
performance. 229 Parties enter into contracts for an objective purpose. 230
While both parties may enter into such agreements for separate reasons,
parties generally have a “common object” between them. 231 Unlike the
doctrine of impracticability or impossibility, the doctrine of frustration
doesn’t wholly depend on either the impossibility or difficulty in
performance. 232 Simply put, the doctrine of frustration applies where parties
lack any reason for the continuance of the contract.233 Though the doctrines
of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration are fundamentally
different, supervening events, like an act of God or market failure, similarly
give rise to claims of all three. Frustration of purpose favors buyers and
lessees, while impossibility or impracticability favors lessors and sellers. 234
Courts tend to interpret this doctrine differently. Some courts grant relief if
frustration occurs out of a “common object” to the contracting parties
jointly, while others grant relief on a more one-sided basis.235
To evaluate frustration, The Second Restatement of Contracts sets out
three requirements.236 The first requirement is that the frustrated purpose
must be a principal purpose of one of the parties contracting. 237 That
principal purpose must be fundamental to the party contracting. 238 The
second requirement is that the frustration must be severe. 239 The severity of
the frustration must go beyond any assumable risk. 240 The final requirement
is that the parties could not have considered the frustration’s occurrence. 241

229.
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232.
233.
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CORBIN, supra note 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Instead, parties must have assumed the opposite. 242 Considering
foreseeability, the Restatement signifies that a frustrating event does not
necessarily need to be unforeseeable, though court interpretation and
resulting case law may dictate otherwise. 243
Frustration of purpose sometimes manifests in oil and gas contracts.
Events that have caused parties to invoke the doctrine of frustration include
state-imposed moratoria on hydraulic fracturing. 244 Here, parties sought
relief due to a lack of productivity caused by the imposed restrictions on
drilling within the state of New York. 245 In this case, the producers
attempted to use the doctrine of frustration to extend the subsequent leases
beyond their primary terms.246 The producers contended that hydraulic
fracturing was the only viable method to obtain oil and gas from the leased
lands, and the usage of traditional methods would be irresponsible and
unprofitable.247 Ultimately, the court found that the lease failed to specify
specific unconventional drilling methods and that the state directive was
foreseeable, the producers were not entitled to relief. 248
Whether COVID-19 frustrates contractual performance depends in part
on jurisdiction and factual matters within individual cases. To determine
applicability, answering the three requirements of the Restatement as they
relate to COVID-19 may shed light on the survivability of a frustration
claim. To survive the first requirement, a party must assert that a contested
purpose is of principle. For purposes of analysis, envision two parties
contracting for the sale and delivery of oil or gas. Hypothetically, if a
drastic reduction in global transportation coupled with an insurmountable
decline in oil demand manifested during the execution of a contract, then
the purpose of sale and delivery likely faces a contractual challenge.
Consider port closure, for example. If ports indefinitely closed due to the
ongoing pandemic, the purpose of a hypothetical delivery of oil or gas
would likely be frustrated. The delivery serves as principal purpose of the
contract, and the inability to deliver and receive the goods likely frustrates
both contracting parties. The second element requires severity of
frustration. Undoubtedly, indefinite port closure is an exemplary illustration
of extremity. Considering global trading, that indefinite port closure due to
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
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Id.
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a pandemic goes beyond any level of reasonable risk assumption. When
parties agree and contract for the sale and delivery of oil or gas, they
assume the product will reach them. The parties contract under the
assumption of product delivery. Therefore, that assumption likely
establishes the third element of frustration, thus giving rise to a
commendable claim. This example, though extreme, serves to highlight the
ramifications of a rampant global pandemic.
Remedy, Looking On, & Conclusion
Deducing a solution or an avenue of relief centers on the notion of
reading your contract thoroughly. Looking on, it may become increasingly
important to include a force majeure provision including pandemic and
epidemic verbiage. Though these events in real-time are unprecedented,
they now establish a floor for future contract drafting. The following force
majeure provision demonstrates the incorporation of pandemic related
language:
FORCE MAJEURE. Neither Party will be liable for any failure
or delay in performing an obligation under this Agreement that is
due to any of the following causes, to the extent beyond its
reasonable control: acts of God, accident, riots, war, terrorist act,
epidemic, pandemic, quarantine, civil commotion, breakdown of
communication facilities, breakdown of web host, breakdown of
internet service provider, natural catastrophes, governmental acts
or omissions, changes in laws or regulations, national strikes,
fire, explosion, generalized lack of availability of raw materials
or energy.
For the avoidance of doubt, Force Majeure shall not include (a)
financial distress nor the inability of either party to make a profit
or avoid a financial loss, (b) changes in market prices or
conditions, or (c) a party's financial inability to perform its
obligations hereunder.249
A provision, like the one above, including language relating to epidemics,
pandemics, and quarantine restriction better adheres to future events. The
inclusion of verbiage relating to pandemics and epidemics affords
contracting parties better protection for unforeseen events in the future.
249. The Bureau of National Affairs, Pandemic Force Majeure Clause, BLOOMBERG
LAW: PRACTICAL GUIDANCE, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/health/document/
X3NNK6S4000000 (last visited May 21, 2021).
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Similar additions arose after the terrorist attack on 9/11 and, depending on
geographic relevance, after significant natural disasters like hurricane
Katrina, Rita, and Harvey. In the future, contracting parties may not get to
debate foreseeability. Given the precedent this pandemic has presented us
with, the forthcoming of similar events may give rise to less protection.
Therefore, being more proactive in the future requires an understanding of
the likelihood of occurrence of events, like COVID-19. As the oil and gas
industry takes slow steps to return to normalcy, the increasing importance
of contract language remains. Now more than ever, it is important to
consider the terms of one’s contractual agreement, as a remedy in the future
considering the occurrence of drastic events like COVID-19 may become
sparingly limited.
Industry Conclusion & Outlook
In conclusion, 2020 was nothing short of an interesting year. Though
global oil demand fell by roughly 25% in April 2020, demand has since
rebounded a considerable amount, though not to pre-pandemic levels. 250
Despite the chaos that has ensued upon the oil and gas industry due to
COVID-19, analysts predict trends of restorative growth in 2021. 251 The
final months of 2020 provided the oil and gas industry with a more
promising outlook than expected.252
Additionally, The United States government commenced remedial action
to combat the encumbrance of economic hardship. In the wake of the
pandemic, President Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (“CARES”) Act into law.253 The Act aims to relieve
domestic industry due to the impact of COVID-19.254 Although the Act
refrains from targeting direct relief to domestic oil and gas companies, it
indirectly benefits many companies within the energy sector. 255 This
indirect benefit is applauded by the department of energy, yet faces harsh
250. 2021 Oil and Gas Industry Outlook, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/
pages/energy-and-resources/articles/oil-and-gas-industry-outlook.html (last visited May 21,
2021).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Roland Backhaus et al., CARES Act: Key Takeaways for Energy Companies, JD
SUPRA (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cares-act-key-takeaways-forenergy-78680/.
254. Id.
255. Department of Energy Applauds Passage of the CARES Act, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.energy.gov/articles/department-energy-applaudspassage-cares-act.
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opposition from critics and politicians outside of the industry. 256 The
criticism spurs from the Act’s tax relief measures. 257 The Act purports to
give companies within the energy sector tax breaks due to economic
hardship and uncertainty generated as a result of the pandemic. 258 The tax
relief afforded to the industry includes payroll tax deferral, expanded writeoffs, accelerated refunds, and loss carrybacks. 259 Payroll tax deferral grants
employers broader discretion to delay FICA tax payments. 260 Loss
carrybacks serve to benefit the oil and gas industry from the economic
uncertainty provided by the ongoing global pandemic. The CARES act
gives struggling businesses the opportunity to deduct losses in one year
from previous years’ profits.261 This relief provides for greater liquidity and
cash flow to increase survivability within industries challenged during the
pandemic. 262
In addition to positive industry forecasts and stimulus-based relief, the
introduction of the coronavirus vaccine led to an increase in oil futures out
of optimism. 263 This signals promise in the efforts of recovery to prepandemic levels of both demand and output.264 Though many reputable
individuals maintain that COVID-19 is here to stay for the foreseeable
future, the oil and gas industry nevertheless remains adaptive to change.

256. Id.
257. Lydia O’Neal, Energy Companies Reap Tax Breaks as they Brace for Virus Impact,
BLOOMBERG TAX (May 22, 2020), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/energycompanies-reap-tax-breaks-as-they-brace-for-virus-impact.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Emily Murphy et al., Payroll tax deferral: Deferred payments can lead to deferred
tax deductions, PLANTE MORAN (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.plantemoran.com/explore-ourthinking/insight/2020/12/payroll-tax-deferral-deferred-payments-can-lead-to-deferred-taxdeductions.
261. .Tax Treatment of Net Operating Losses (NOLs) in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11296.
262. Id.
263. .Alex Longley, Oil Hits Two-Month High With Vaccine Hope Offsetting Demand
Fear, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 10, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-andacquisitions/oil-rises-above-40-with-vaccine-buoying-hope-of-demand-recovery?context
=search&index=6.
264. Id.
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